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Economic and commercial relations between the countries of the southern 
Mediterranean and the European Union (EU) have been profoundly affected by the 
recent ‘EU Initiative for the Mediterranean’ and conditioned by the creation of 
European Monetary Union (EMU). The paper discusses the costs, benefits and 
prospects of these two processes in terms of their economic consequences on the 
countries of the southern Mediterranean, and in particular on the Tunisian economy. 
The association agreement between the EU and Tunisia  is assessed in the light of its 
medium-period implications and of the EU’s enlargement to include the countries of 
Eastern Europe. With regard to EMU, the paper discusses the influence and effects 
exerted by introduction of the euro on the Tunisian economy. 
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1. Introduction 
During the 1990s the European Union (EU) undertook numerous initiatives which 
redefined its economic and commercial relations with non-EU countries. Some of 
them were mainly concerned with ‘neighbouring’ countries, cases in point being the 
enlargement of the EU and the association agreements with a number of countries in 
Eastern Europe and the southern Mediterranean area. Other initiatives like the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) have had much wider repercussions by altering the 
structure of international monetary relations. 
This paper examines the evolution of economic relations between the economies 
of the southern Mediterranean and the EU. It analyses the short- and medium-period 
economic consequences of two main processes: the association agreements between 
the EU and some southern Mediterranean countries, and the creation of EMU. 
Analysed in particular will be the costs, benefits and prospects of these processes 
regarding one on the most dynamic countries in the southern Mediterranean: Tunisia. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the terms of 
the association agreement between Tunisia and the EU and analyses its benefits and 
costs for the Tunisian economy in the light of the enlargement of the EU towards the 
countries of Eastern Europe. Section 3 examines the main channels through which the 
introduction of the euro might affect Tunisia. Section 4 concludes and briefly 
discusses the economic policy responses best able to ensure that closer integration 
with the EU will generate concrete development opportunities for the Tunisian 
economy. 
 
2. The association agreement between the EU and Tunisia    
2.1. The terms of the agreement 
The principles of the EU’s strategy for cooperation with the countries of the southern 
Mediterranean were ratified by the Barcelona Declaration of November 1995. By 
explicitly acknowledging the need to promote economic development in all the 
countries of the Mediterranean also through forms of cooperation with Europe,
1 this 
Declaration laid the basis for the creation of a free-trade area.  
                                                           
1 For a detailed analysis of the evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean strategy and of the Barcelona 
agreements see Nosuli et al. (1996), Alonso-Gamo et al. (1997) and Gendarme (1999). For analysis of 
the relations with the three southern Mediterranean countries – Cyprus, Malta and Turkey – which have 
already begun negotiations to join the EU see Temparano-Arroyo and Feldman (1998).   3
As part of this strategy, again in 1995 an association agreement was signed with 
Tunisia with the objective of strengthening political and economic relations between 
the two areas
2. The agreement provided for the liberalization of trade relations 
between the EU and Tunisia, greater technical and financial cooperation, and closer 
collaboration on political and cultural matters. 
As regards commercial aspects, the agreement provided for a free-trade area in 
industrial goods to be gradually created over a period of twelve years. In effect, it is 
since 1976 that almost all Tunisian manufactured products have enjoyed free access to 
the European market, with the significant exception of textiles. Consequently, with 
the new agreement the EU has extended preferential access to the textiles sector as 
well, while Tunisia for its part has undertaken to remove all tariff and non-tariff 
barriers to industrial imports from the EU. Restrictions still apply to agricultural 
products, although the agreement has enabled some progress to be made as regards 
integration between the two areas, the intention being to review issues relative to this 
important sector in the course of the current year.  
The agreement also envisages changes in the regulation, harmonization of the 
quality standards of Tunisian goods and the removal of all practices which hamper 
free competition and trade between the two areas, like the monopolies, public 
subsidies and fiscal and financial privileges still granted to state-owned enterprises in 
Tunisia. 
Finally, to deal with the economic and social costs that inevitably arise during the 
adjustment period, the EU will increase the financial aid envisaged by the ‘EU 
Initiative for the Mediterranean’ and it will strengthen cooperation in the social and 
cultural fields. 
2.2. The benefits for Tunisia 
The benefits deriving to Tunisia from the association agreement with the EU should 
be substantial and should pass through various channels. 
Firstly, according to the standard theory of international trade, following 
integration, incomes and employment should increase as a result of (i) the better 
allocation of existing resources (the static effect) and (ii) the greater competitiveness 
                                                           
2 To be precise, the association agreement with Tunisia was signed in July 1995 and therefore predates 
the Barcelona Conference. However, the principles on which it is based are clearly the same as those 
established some months later in Spain   4
on markets of goods and factors, the expansion of potential markets, and the full 
exploitation of scale and scope economies (the dynamic effect). 
As specifically regards the effects of the Euro-Tunisian agreement, the prediction 
is that it will lead to a significant increase in the domestic product. Despite all the 
shortcomings of attempts to quantify the long-term economic effects of agreements of 
this kind, Rutheford et al. (1995) calculate that  the annual increase in GDP will be 
around 4.5%, while Brown et al. (1997) foresee a short-period fall in Tunisia’s 
national income off-set by a 3.3% annual growth rate in the long period.
3  According 
to these authors, the benefits will pass through new investments and the re-allocation 
of production factors to sectors with greater competitive advantages. The new 
investments will be also fostered both by the harmonization of laws and regulations 
with consequent greater penetration of Tunisian products in European markets, and 
the improved transport and telecommunications made possible by EU aid. Both 
Rutheford et al. and Brown et al. believe that their forecasts are extremely prudent in 
that they do not include the effects of the technological spillovers that will 
presumably affect the Tunisian economy as a result of its greater openness to trade. 
But the association agreement should also act as a catalyst for economic growth. 
Firstly, within the country, the agreement should foster a general strategy for reform 
and modernization, while the closer relationship with the EU should help the Tunisian 
authorities to overcome political and social resistance against implementation of 
reforms. A striking example of this is the plan for industrial restructuring and 
modernization (mise à niveau). Begun in 1996 with the help of international funding, 
the aim of this plan is to prepare Tunisian manufacturing firms for the liberalization of 
markets and the greater competition that will ensue. The plan’s results have so far 
been positive; a recent survey by the IMF (1999a) of a sample of firms involved in the 
modernization programme has shown that they have achieved increases in 
employment, sales and exports significantly above the national average. 
Secondly, the agreement should increase Tunisia’s ability to attract foreign capital 
and in particular direct investments. The increase in direct investments
4 will be 
                                                           
3 Brown et al. (1997) have also calculated the benefits to Europe. These, of course, will be much less 
substantial, and almost negligible at the European level, but closely concentrated on France, Italy and 
Spain.  
4 Tunisia has for some time pursued a policy of openness to direct foreign investments which has 
already attracted significant amounts of capital. For instance, in the early 1990s the energy sector had 
already received huge foreign investments. Since the second half of the 1990s there has been a revival 
of investments in manufacturing and in tourism. In 1996, around 88 percent of the foreign firms   5
stimulated by the less uncertain political and economic situation arising from 
implementation of the agreement and the greater confidence of foreign investors. The 
agreement has both strengthened the Tunisian authorities’ commitment to the creation 
of a more extensive and open market economy, and has introduced provisions which 
make more vigorous enforcement possible.  
Of the various forms of internationalization that will probably follow the 
agreement, particular attention should be paid to the so-called ‘outward processing 
trade’. This is a phenomenon which involves the delocation by foreign firms of 
certain phases of their production processes to local firms, and the subsequent re-
importing of the semi-finished or finished products so that they can undergo final 
processing or be marketed in the country of origin. It is therefore a form of 
international sub-contracting with the initial exporting and then importing of goods to 
which partial and more favourable tax treatment is applied by the EU regulations. 
This type of internationalization is obviously advantageous to the contractor; but it is 
also advantageous – and this is here the more interesting aspect – to the destination 
country. For the latter, the advantages take the form not only of an immediate increase 
in aggregate demand, but also of knowledge transfers, opportunities to gain 
professional expertise, and commercial contacts which if properly exploited may 
trigger enduring processes of industrialization in the areas of destination. Of course, 
these experiences must be take place in settings which are conducive to them in terms 
of entrepreneurial abilities, know-how, infrastructures and the availability of skilled 
labour. Tunisia is experiencing outward processing trade, and it may increase 
significantly in the future with spillovers on the domestic industrialisation. In fact, 
geographical proximity to contractors, relatively low labour costs, experience in 
relevant sectors are necessary conditions for outward processing trade which are 
already in place in Tunisia.  
2.3. The costs of the agreement for the Tunisian economy 
As in all integration processes, the benefits are necessarily associated with costs. 
Those accruing to Tunisia from the agreement are of essentially two types: fiscal costs 
                                                                                                                                                                      
operating in Tunisia were European, and of these 17 percent were French (Ferguéne and Ben Hamida 
1999). For broader analysis of the role of direct investments in the countries of the southern 
Mediterranean see Bellon and Gouia (1998), Ferguéne and Ben Hamida (1999).  
   6
and reallocation costs which, during transition, may give rise to competitive 
difficulties and to larger amounts of unemployed resources. 
As regards taxes, considering the structure of Tunisia’s revenues (Table 1), the 
reduction of trade tariffs will lead to considerable loss of tax yield. In 1995, the year 
in which the agreement came into effect, the average effective tariff in Tunisia was 
around 20 percent, which was 2 percent higher than the average in the EU area.
5 It is 
estimated that when the agreement is fully operative, it will reduce the revenues from 
customs duties by around 50 percent. Bearing in mind that customs duties account for 
4.3 percent of GDP, the trade agreement will reduce revenues by more than 2 percent 
of GDP.
6 Moreover, it is not certain that the loss of tax yield by the Tunisian 
government will increase consumer welfare. To the extent that Tunisian importers 
(one of which is the state itself) do not transfer the lower tariffs to final prices, and if 
the tariffs that remain on non-EU products allow increases in the prices of European 
exports, it is likely that Tunisian importers (not consumers) and European exporters 
will benefit most from the agreement. 
[Insert Table 1] 
In any case, although the negative effect on duties will be to some extent off-set 
by the additional fiscal revenues generated by economic growth, there is no doubt 
that, at least initially, the government will be confronted by a fiscal problem that, the 
public deficit remaining equal, will require greater tax revenues from other sources or 
reduced public spending. 
In addition to the fiscal costs, Tunisia will have to bear the cost of reallocating 
resources towards new activities given that before the agreement the Tunisian 
economy enjoyed a high level of protection which enabled the survival in the market 
of non-competitive products which, with the new free-trade regime, will in many 
cases be forced out by European products. Moreover, although adjustment to 
European regulations and quality standards will favour the penetration of foreign 
markets by Tunisian products, it will result in significant increases in the production 
costs of Tunisian firms. 
                                                           
5 Values lower than Tunisia’s are applied in other countries of other southern Mediterranean countries, 
like Algeria and Egypt, where the average effective tariff on trade was 17 percent, or Morocco, where 
it was 15 percent. 
6 Still in force are tariffs on imports from non-EU countries and tariffs on certain agro-food products 
imported from the EU. For detailed analysis of the problems and fiscal costs caused by the association 
agreement see Adeb (1998).   7
2.4. The repercussions of enlargement of the EU 
As the majority of observers argue, although the adjustment phase will be prolonged 
and will give rise to considerable costs, Tunisia’s initial situation and the current state 
of its economy should provide sufficient guarantees that the net benefits to the 
country from the agreement will be positive, and that in all likelihood they will be 
substantial. 
In the light of the preceding discussion, there are clear grounds for being 
optimistic about the Tunisian economy’s possibilities of growth and 
internationalization deriving from the integration with the EU countries, in line with 
the past experiences of the northern Mediterranean countries and the present ones of 
the countries of Eastern Europe. These experiences are certainly encouraging, and 
they clearly show that processes of greater openness and reform are generally 
accompanied by an increase in trade and a wave of direct investments which in turn 
help to accelerate integration and economic growth.  
However, Tunisia’s integration is distinguished by a number of important 
differences that should be borne in mind. Firstly, the country is characterized by an 
initial situation in which trade with the EU area is already very substantial, so that the 
advantages of closer integration will be less immediately apparent. 
Secondly, unlike the cases of Spain, Portugal and Greece in the past, and of the 
Eastern European countries today, there is little prospect of Tunisia joining the EU. 
Furthermore, the association agreement is being implemented in a period when the 
EU is considering an enlargement of unprecedented proportions in its history. The 
historical, cultural, political and strategic reasons for the enlargement of the EU to 
include the countries of Eastern Europe are much less substantial in the case of the 
southern Mediterranean countries. Moreover, the Union’s enlargement to the East is 
already creating problems for the southern Mediterranean countries, which are facing 
the increased competition in their main outlet market – Europe – raised by those 
countries that have aggressively entered international markets only in recent years, 
and have massively reoriented their trade towards the EU (Table 2).  
[Insert Table 2] 
The countries of Eastern Europe, in fact, share a number of features in common 
with those of the southern Mediterranean. They, too, are geographically close to the 
EU and have very low labour costs – in some cases even lower than in the southern 
Mediterranean (Ferguéne and Ben Hamida, 1999). However, the Eastern European   8
countries have labour forces which are on average better skilled and culturally closer 
to the mentality of the European partners than their counterparts in the Maghreb 
countries. Moreover, they benefit from the more favourable political-economic 
relationships deriving from their concrete prospects of joining the EU. In fact, the 
prospect of being one of the next countries to join the EU and the EMU creates a 
climate of confidence and optimistic expectations which gives the Eastern European 
countries an important competitive advantage over those of the southern 
Mediterranean. Consequently, although it is at present difficult to assess whether the 
increased trade with Europe by the Eastern European countries has been at the 
expense of the southern Mediterranean countries (Chevallier et al., 1999), it is 
indubitable that the EU’s enlargement to the East will expose Tunisia to a marked 
increase in competition on European markets and for European resources. 
In the case of Tunisia, this competition raised by the countries of Eastern Europe 
is aggravated by the fact that the EU has also signed association agreements with 
other countries of the southern Mediterranean, like Egypt and Morocco, which are 
much larger in terms of the size of their outlet markets, and towards which resources 
and direct investments may be directed. 
 
3. The euro and the Tunisian market 
During the implementation of the association agreement between the EU and Tunisia, 
economic relations between the two areas are and will be conditioned by the advent of 
European Monetary Union. The introduction of the euro is an event of great 
importance both for the European economies and for other countries as well, 
especially those with close economic links with the EMU area, like those of the 
southern Mediterranean and Tunisia in particular. 
This section examines the effects of introduction of the euro on the southern 
Mediterranean economies, also in the light of the association agreements between the 
two areas. Discussed in particular are the mechanisms that will transmit the effects of 
the introduction of the euro with the purpose of identifying the risks and opportunities 
created for the Tunisian economy.  
3.1. Economic relations between Tunisia and the EU 
The study of the effects of the introduction of the euro on non-EU countries must 
necessarily start with the analysis of the current economic relations between the euro   9
area and the economies in question. Tunisia is a relatively small country with a 
population of around 10 million and an annual per-capita GDP of about 2500 dollars, 
but it nevertheless trades large quantities of goods with the rest of the world. In 1998, 
the last year for which figures are available, the country’s degree of openness 
measured by the ratio between exports and imports on GDP was 0.73, which is a 
relatively high value when compared with that of countries of similar size and level of 
development (Table 3). 
[Insert Table 3] 
Again in 1998, 61 percent of Tunisia’s current revenues derived from exports, 
with striking results achieved by specialization in the textiles sector (27.5 percent of 
the total) and in the food sector (5.1 percent). Other important items were tourism and 
remittances, which respectively accounted for 16 percent and 8.4 percent of total 
revenues (Figure 1). Debit items were instead concentrated in the commodities sector 
(the importing of commodities accounted for 78.1 percent of total debits in the year), 
but with a more even distribution among consumption goods (27.5 percent), raw 
materials and semi-finished goods (22.3 percent), and investment goods (18 percent; 
Figure 2). 
[Insert Figure 1] 
[Insert Figure 2] 
However, it should be emphasised that Tunisia has economic relations mainly 
with the EU. The importance of the EU for Tunisia’s international trade is highlighted 
by the incidence of the EU countries in each item of the Tunisian balance of payments 
(Tables 3 and 4). In 1998, the shares of exports and imports to and from the EU 
amounted respectively to 81 percent and 72 percent, while the EU accounted for 77 
percent of Tunisia’s revenues from tourism. These are extremely high values, not only 
compared with the other countries of the southern Mediterranean but also with trade 
in goods and services among the countries belonging to the European Union. 
[Insert Table 4] 
Another distinctive feature of the Tunisian economy is the concentration of trade. 
Just two countries, France and Italy, account for 50 percent and 47.3 percent of 
Tunisia’s total exports and imports respectively (Figs. 3 and 4). As regards tourism, 
Germany and France contend for first place, with a combined share of 48.7 percent of 
total revenues of the sector.  
[Insert Figure 3]   10
[Insert Figure 4] 
It is important to note, however, that the high proportion of imports and exports 
with the EU is not matched by an equally widespread use of European currencies in 
contracts and international payments. Table 5 shows the structure of current payments 
on the basis of the currencies of denomination. Despite the slight increase in the use 
of European currencies in recent years, the commercial weight of the European 
countries is still much greater that the role performed by their currencies in the 
settling of international payments. The secondary role of European currencies is 
confirmed if one looks at the denomination currencies of Tunisia’s foreign debt, of 
which 41.7 percent was denominated in dollars and 16.2 percent in Japanese yen at 
the end of 1998 (Figure 5). 
[Insert Table 5] 
[Insert Figure 5] 
Despite the high commercial integration, Tunisia’s financial integration is much 
less developed.
7 Table 6 shows Tunisia’s net foreign investment position, which 
displays a negligible role of portfolio investments and a larger amount of direct 
investments and medium- and long-term loans. The latter are mainly the result of 
measures by the international financial institutions or the government of individual 
countries, among which the European ones once again predominate.
8  
[Insert Table 6] 
Much less substantial is recourse to the international capital market, where 
Tunisia makes few issues, mainly by its public institutions and in relatively small 
quantities (Fig. 6). 




                                                           
7 This is borne out by the restrictions on current payments and capital movements which, according to 
indices constructed by the International Monetary Fund, are still particularly pronounced in Tunisia, 
both in absolute values and when compared with other southern Mediterranean countries. Cf. IMF, 
1999b. 
8 In 1998, loans from international financial bodies amounted to around 45 percent of Tunisia’s total 
long-term loans, compared with the around 43 percent of financing obtained on a bilateral basis: of the 
latter, 71 percent has been provided by EU countries.    11
3.2. The effects of the introduction of the euro on economic relations between Tunisia 
and the EU     
The introduction of the euro affects the Tunisian economy through various channels. 
In this section we analyse the effects that work through trade relations, the exchange 
rate, and financial integration between the two areas. 
3.2.1. The commercial channel 
It is well known that the main economic justification for introducing the euro is that 
monetary union – because of reduced transaction costs, increased competition, greater 
macroeconomic stability, and lower interest rates – should significantly boost the 
growth rates of the European economies. This expected higher growth and closer 
integration among the countries involved in EMU constitute two possible channels for 
the EMU’s influence on the economies of non-EU countries. 
Firstly, associated with European growth is an ‘income effect’ which will be to 
the benefit of the economies external to the EU. Of course, the extent of the income 
effect on the non-EU economies will depend on the level and nature of the integration 
between these countries and the EU. In the case of Tunisia, as we have seen, this 
integration is very close as far as trade in goods and services is concerned. However, 
because Tunisian exports are mainly concentrated in the textile and agro-food sectors 
–goods for which the elasticity of demand to income is relatively low – it is likely that 
the effects of EU income variations on the Tunisian economy will be relatively minor. 
More important, from this point of view, may be the consequences on tourist flows to 
Tunisia, although in this case it will be principally incomes variations in France and 
Germany that will be decisive. The income effect will also have to take account of the 
closer synchronization of the economic cycles of the European economies which is 
likely to come about as European economic integration proceeds. The implication of 
this process is that fluctuations in European demand for Tunisian exports will 
increase, given that they will not be (at least partially) off-set by the different cycles 
of the European economies. 
Besides the income effect, growing intra-EU integration will engender a 
‘substitution effect’. Reduced transaction costs in intra-EU trade will give producers 
in the EMU a comparative advantage which may be accompanied by a decline in 
imports from non-EU countries. This channel becomes all the more important if 
viewed in the light of the EU’s enlargement to include the Eastern European   12
countries. Once again, however, the effective importance of this effect will depend on 
the patterns of specialization of the economies in question. In the case of Tunisia, 
there may be some repercussions on the textile sector, while the effects should be 
much less marked on tourism, a sector where integration is slower and constrained by 
the specific geographical and cultural features of each country, and also on the agro-
food sector, where Tunisia produces goods which only partly compete with European 
ones.
9 
Feldman et al. (1998) have sought to measure the impact of the income and 
substitution effects on a group of countries in the southern Mediterranean. Their study 
shows that, of the Maghreb countries, Tunisia is the most sensitive to events in 
Europe, with markedly higher levels of the elasticity of exports to European GDP and 
to the increased competitiveness of European producers. Overall, however, the joint 
result of the two effects should be positive, stimulating an increase in Tunisian GDP 
of approximately 0.2 percent (Table 7).
10  
[Insert Table 7] 
 
3.2.2. The exchange rate channel 
A second channel through which EMU may influence the economies of the non-EU 
countries is the exchange rate between the euro and other currencies. While EMU by 
definition eliminates the problem of exchange rate variability within the EMU area, at 
the same time it will probably increase the euro’s variability vis-à-vis the principal 
non-EU currencies, for two main reasons: first, the greater uncertainty that markets 
may associate in the short and medium period with the new monetary and political 
institutions of the EMU countries; second, the fact that the EMU area is much less 
economically integrated with the rest of the world than are the individual economies 
that belong to it, and is therefore less subject to influence by variations in its 
currency’s exchange rate. 
                                                           
9 It should also be pointed out that the agro-food sector is influenced by developments in EU 
agricultural policy, which in the medium and long period is set to introduce major changes which will 
reduce the protection now enjoyed by European agriculture and therefore open up opportunities for 
non-EU countries.    
10 More specifically, the income effect should produce increases of 1.9 percent and 0.6 percent in 
Tunisian exports and income respectively, while the substitution effect, on the hypothesis of a 3 percent 
elasticity to price and of a 5 percent reduction in  costs to producers in the EMU area, should give rise 
to 1.3 percent  and 0.4 percent reductions in exports and income (Feldman et al., 1998).    13
The importance of the exchange rate channel in transmitting the effects of EMU 
depends on the exchange rate regime adopted by each country, on the level of 
economic-financial integration with the euro area, and on the price elasticities of 
imports and exports. Those countries that tie their currencies to the euro will 
experience gains and losses of competitiveness in non-euro-regulated international 
trade according to the euro’s oscillations with respect to the main currencies, first and 
foremost the US dollar. Likewise, in the case of oscillations in the euro’s exchange 
rate, those countries whose currencies are tied to the dollar will experience variations 
in their competitiveness on European markets. 
As regards Tunisia, its close economic integration with the EU may limit the 
effects of fluctuations by the euro. In this case, however, assessment of the 
importance of this channel is complicated by two factors. Firstly, as we have seen, the  
structure of Tunisia’s currency payments is biased towards the dollar and, albeit to a 
lesser extent, the yen. Moreover, as Table 5 shows, the composition by currency of 
the country’s current payments is significantly different from that of its receipts. More 
in particular, there is a greater quantity of payments in dollars (37.9 percent) than in 
European currencies (52.9 percent) compared with the respective receipts (20 percent 
and 35.7 percent). This implies that the oscillations of the euro will have an impact, 
albeit indirectly, on Tunisia’s terms of trade. 
Secondly, it is difficult to assess Tunisia’s exchange rate policy, which has to date 
pursued the objective of a quasi-fixed exchange rate with respect to a basket of 
currencies of both competing countries and trading partners. Although information on 
the basket’s composition is not available, the importance of the euro is certainly very 
significant.
11 In any event, if, as is likely, the implementing of EMU will give the euro 
an important role as an international currency (Portes and Rey, 1998; Huisman et al., 
2000), also the structure by currency of Tunisia’s international transactions will shift 
towards the European currency, and this will alter the role of the euro in the reference 
basket of the Tunisian monetary authorities.
12 The overall outcome, also taking 
account of the geographical specialization of Tunisia’s international trade, should be 
                                                           
11 The major importance of the EU currencies is borne out by the oscillations in the real exchange rates 
of the Tunisian dinar with respect to the dollar and the European currencies. In the period 1993-96, for 
example, the standard deviation of the real exchange rate against the dollar was 6.3 and only 1.3 
against the European currencies: cf. Feldman et al. (1998). 
12 According to Bénassy-Quéré and Lahréche-Révil (1999), all the Maghreb countries, if they are to 
fulfil the criteria of the theory of optimal monetary areas, should use the euro as their reference   14
the greater independence of Tunisian competitiveness from the euro’s oscillations 
with respect to the other principal currencies. 
As well as on trade, the exchange rate channel also works through its effects on 
servicing Tunisia’s foreign debt. As we have seen, at the end of 1998 the share of 
Tunisian debt denominated in dollars and yen amounted to 57.8 percent, while the 
amount denominated in EU currencies was only 32.7 percent. It is evident that a 
composition of this kind, given the exchange rate regime currently in operation, 
exposes Tunisia to a significant exchange rate risk should the euro depreciate. 
   Finally, the increasing role of the euro in international markets, the structure of 
payments for commercial transactions and for servicing Tunisia’s foreign debt will 
have repercussions on the management and composition of the country’s official 
reserves, with a shift towards the euro. 
3.2.3. The financial channel 
Despite its high degree of openness and commercial integration, Tunisia does not 
exhibit close international financial integration. As regards capital movements 
numerous constraints still apply to both inflows and outflows in spite of the presence 
of a strategy for gradual financial liberalisation. Moreover, the financial system is still 
underdeveloped, although some progress has been made with the financial reforms of 
recent years. This general situation of relative closure to international financial 
transactions and of scant development of financial structures restricts the importance 
of the financial channels through which EMU could exert its effects on the Tunisian 
economy. It may have some repercussions on direct investments and on management 
of the foreign debt, but the impact of effects operating through portfolio investments 
will be much more modest. 
As regards direct investments from abroad, there might be a substitution effect 
entirely similar to the one discussed with reference to trade flows. To the extent that 
EMU encourages the re-orientation of direct investments to the EU area, this may 
reduce the amount of investments directed towards non-EU economies. This channel 
is particularly important  as regards investments intended to reduce costs, and 
especially in the light of the EU’s enlargement to the East. This may be of some 
importance for Tunisia in that it receives foreign investments mainly in the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
currency. In particular, on the basis of a number of simulations, the two authors argue that the euro 
should have a weight of 87 percent in Tunisia’s optimal reference basket of currencies.   15
manufacturing sector,
13 which exports to the EU and is highly vulnerable to 
competition by the countries of Eastern Europe. Conversely, the consequences should 
be less marked, at least in the short and medium period, on investments made abroad 
either in order to enter new markets or to diversify risk. Of course, the stability of 
Tunisia’s foreign investments will also depend on the economic and commercial 
strategies of the southern Mediterranean countries. Progress in commercial integration 
among these countries should reduce the incentives to relocate investments to the 
EMU area and thus promote direct investments in the countries of the southern 
Mediterranean. 
As far as Tunisia’s foreign debt is concerned, and in addition to the above 
discussion of the exchange rate effect, of importance are the variations of servicing 
the debt due to changes in the level of interest rates on the euro. It may happen, in 
fact, that the introduction of EMU will bring variations in interest rates with it: for 
example, in the medium and long period, there may be a reduction in rates to the 
extent that the EMU countries benefit from more liquid and efficient capital markets 
and from a more robust nominal anchor (Prati and Schinasi, 1997). Of course, the 
importance of this channel of influence depends on the amount and the composition 
of the foreign debt. For example, an index-linked debt strongly exposed to the euro 
will be more vulnerable to oscillations in European rates, whereas the reverse will be 
the case if a large share of the debt has been obtained on facilitated rates of interest. 
These effects can be counteracted to the extent that each country is able to gain access 
to the international capital markets in order to change the currency denomination of 
their debt . 
Finally, the introduction of the euro may be followed by a portfolio composition 
effect. EMU, in fact, has already given rise to pronounced convergence in the returns 
on fixed-income securities in its member countries, where differentials in interest 
rates have practically disappeared, and on shares, where the correlation among stock 
market trends has grown substantially. In response to this convergence of returns, 
European investors may revise their portfolios in order to achieve greater 
diversification and higher returns. This recomposition is likely to benefit the emerging 
countries, especially those that already enjoy a certain amount of political and 
economic stability; which have undertaken institutional reforms to ensure the working 
                                                           
13 In 1998, around 69 percent of direct investments from abroad were made in the Tunisian 
manufacturing sector, as opposed to 27 percent in the energy sector and 3 percent in tourism.   16
of a market economy; and which have reliable financial systems open to international 
financial integration. 
At present the economies of the southern Mediterranean only partly fulfil these 
criteria, although there are important signals that they will be increasingly able to 
attract financial flows in the future. From this point of view, Tunisia occupies a 
leading position among the southern European countries. This is reflected in the risk 
indicators set out in Table 8, on the basis of which Tunisia displays a political risk, an 
economic performance, and a level of debt riskiness better than that of the other 
countries in the area.  
[Insert Table 8] 
This finding is confirmed by the assessments of the principal rating agencies 
(Table 9) which assign an ‘investment grade rating’ to Tunisia, while they do not 
classify Algeria and give a ‘below investment grade rating’ to Morocco (Moody’s and 
Standard & Poor’s) and to Egypt (Moody’s). However, all these countries still have 
extremely low access to capital markets. Scant international integration, especially as 
regards portfolio investments, is a feature shared by all the southern Mediterranean 
countries. However, although this feature impedes them from receiving financial 
resources which can be used to finance their domestic economies, on the other hand it 
insulates them against the events that influence international capital movements. In 
this sense, therefore, the volatility of European interest rates which, in one direction or 
the other, may be associated with the arrival of the euro, should not have significant 
consequences on the countries in question. 
[Insert Table 9] 
 
4. Concluding remarks  
This paper has sought to assess the impact on Tunisia’s economy of the association 
agreement with the EU and of the introduction of EMU. The association agreement 
has led to a greater freedom in trade and in international investments that has exposed 
the Tunisian economy to the pressures of international competition as never before. It 
is important that the Tunisian authorities should continue with reform so that the 
country’s economy can strengthen its capacity to withstand competitive pressures – 
and also in the light of EU initiatives towards the countries of Eastern Europe, which 
are the direct competitors of Tunisian producers in important markets. From this point   17
of view, measures are required to improve the country’s infrastructures, give greater 
efficiency to the financial system and the administrative apparatus, reduce state 
involvement in the economy, and maintain macroeconomic equilibria. 
The prospects of enduring economic growth, however, also depend on progress in 
economic and commercial integration among the countries of the southern 
Mediterranean, with a view to creating a single market for average-income countries 
characterized by similar cultures and patterns of consumption. The creation of a more 
integrated area would also increase the capacity of these countries to attract 
international investments. Overall, therefore, the association agreement is a significant 
opportunity for Tunisia’s development, and if suitably exploited it may lead Tunisia 
towards more complete integration with Europe. 
The introduction of EMU, too, offers opportunities for growth, albeit more 
indirectly and less significantly. In the short and medium period, the effects of EMU 
on the Tunisian economy will closely depend on the effects of EMU on the European 
countries. To the extent that the euro is able to foster the growth of the European 
economies, there will be repercussions on countries closely integrated with the EU 
like Tunisia. In the longer period, however, the effects will depend mainly on the type 
of economic integration that these countries are able to achieve with the countries of 
the EMU area, and on their ability to implement reforms. 
The euro will assume an increasingly important role as an international currency, 
and this will have major repercussions on Tunisia, which, if it wants to limit the risks 
connected with oscillations of the European currency, will have to redenominate in 
euros a large part of its earnings and payments, of its debt, and of its official reserves. 
Further progress should also be made as regards financial integration. The 
challenges now facing Tunisia require resources to finance investments and 
reorganization, and as a consequence closer financial ties with the rest of the world, 
Europe in particular. This progress will further highlight the importance attaching to 
choice of exchange rate regime, and in particular the extent to which Tunisia should 
be anchored to the euro.             18
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1993 1998 1993 1998
71.3 88.6 87.3 81.3
48 47.9 43.4 44.6
56.7 47.1 55.4 59.2
55.5 60.2 51.1 59.7
48.3 61.7 60.4 75.7
57.9 68 54.6 70.8
34.5 44.6 33.5 42.4
69.3 62.9 64.8 69.9
41.4 60.2 45.3 56.1
29.6 51.3 27.9 48.1
61.6 65.5 62.1 69.4












Table 2: EU Trade with Eastern European Countries
(as percent  of total export/import of each country)






Total Revenues Taxes on Income
and Profits
Taxes on Goods and
          Services
EU Import Duties
24.52 5.9 10.61 2.53
17.05 6.16 4.57 1.34
11.52 2.78 4.91 2.21
20.06 4.69 9.82 3.18
Table. 1: Structure of Fiscal Revenues
(average values 1994-96; as percent of GDP)





































   Travel
   Tourism
   Other Services
Compensation of employees
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Source: Tunisian Central Statistical Office
° Trade with EU in brackets;




























Table. 3: Trade Openness and Trade with EU Countries (1998)




1992 1998 1992 1998
31.2 20 36.5 37.9
17.5 18 28.9 25.8
9.8 8.7 8.6 8.9
4.9 5.2 7.6 10.4
1.6 1.9 1.3 1.4
3.4 3.8 5.7 7.8
35.6 35.7 50.8 52.9
31.6 42.4 11.4 7.8










Table 5: Current Transactions – Shares by currency
Credit
Reserve Assets 2149
Source: Tunisian Central Statistical Office
-10525 Long-term Loans
Short-term Loans -524




Table 6 International Investment Position (1998)







 Table. 8: Risk Indicators (*) 







































58 55,47  13,95  9,38  9,91  0,00  2,56 
Morocco 
 
56 55,05  14,06  8,64  10,00 0,11  3,89 
Tunisia 49  59,1  15,69  10,67  10  0,02  2,56 
 
(*)  Higher values are associated with lower risk 
(1)  Ranking among 180 countries based on 9 indicators analysed by Euromoney . 





Export GDP Export GDP
(percent) (percent) (percent) (percent)
-0.34 -1.3 -0.4 1.9 0.6
-0.23 -0.7 -0.2 0.3 0.1
-0.23 -0.6 0 1 0.1
-0.26 -0.9 -0.2 1.1 0.2
Table 7: Effects of EMU on Selected African Countries Exports and GDP
Impact of 1% rise




















Table 9: Financial Indicators  
Rating of foreign debt (**)   Foreign 
debt/GDP 
(*) 













Algeria  60,4 27,7 10,1  -0,2  ND  ND  ND 
Egypt  41,4 37,3 64,9 2,4  Ba1  BBB-  BBB- 
Morocco  61,0 36,9 24,3 3,8  Ba1  ND  BB 
Tunisia  52,8 32,7- 37,2 2,0  Baa3(+)  BBB-  BBB 
(*) 1997 
(**) 2000 
Source: IMF, Moody’s, Fitch IBCA, Standard & Poor’s  
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  Source: Tunisian Central Statistical Office 
 
 









Figure  2: Composition of Trade: Imports (1998)


















  Source: Tunisian Central Statistical Office 














































Other EMU currencies 14.2%
Other currencies 10%
Source: Capital Data
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